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NAFTA:   Testing Ricardo’s Theory of  
Comparative Advantage by  
Empirical Evidence Pre-and Post NAFTA 
 
By Bruce D. Fisher, Professor Emeritus 
 
“Today everything comes under the laws of competition and the survival 
of the fittest, where the powerful feed upon the powerless. As a 
consequence, masses of people find themselves excluded and 
marginalized:  without work, without possibilities, without any means of 
escape.” Excerpt from Pope Francis’ Evangelli Gaudium 20131 
     
 
The scene was the boardroom of Mega Corporation (hereinafter 
Mega). Mega manufactured auto parts in Pleasantville, Tennessee. Its 
workforce consisted of 900 blue-collar and 20 white-collar full-time 
employees. Mega’s plant was over 30 years old. The CEO and board were 
deciding between building a new, state-of-the-art plant in Tennessee, and 
moving production to Mexico, where hourly labor costs and 
manufacturing costs (including fringe benefits) were $6.23 per hour, 
compared to the $37.74 per hour2 they paid manufacturing workers in the 
US. 
Clarence Smith, Mega’s CEO, observed, “After taking account of 
severance pay to Pleasantville blue collar workers, the low Mexican wages 
would make Mega competitive in the world market again. Workers here 
make too much. I move that we relocate in Mexico. Any discussion?” 
Board member, Sam Jones, asked, “Clarence, have we made any 
long-term commitments to our blue collar workers? I wouldn’t want to 
pull the rug out from under them. Most have mortgages, kids in school, 
and live from paycheck to paycheck.”                        
      “Oh they know their jobs are at risk,” Smith answered. “But most 
have second jobs or spouses that work. Also, they will collect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Holy Father Frances, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium of the Holy Father 
Francis to the Bishops, Clergy, Consecrated Persons and the Lay Faithful on the 
Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World, VATICAN (2013), 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-
francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html.  
2 See Competitiveness in Manufacturing, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 30 (2012), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/fls/chartbook/2012/section3.pdf.  
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unemployment benefits.  Speaking of benefits, if we relocate to Mexico, 
corporate profits will increase by over $1 million a year, year after year.”    
      Sam Jones saw the opportunity to redeem himself. “In light of 
that,” said Jones, “I move that the CEO and CFO who devised the move to 
Mexico each receive $250,000 bonuses. Any objections?” The Mega 
board of directors approved both the relocation to Mexico and the 
executive bonuses. 
     “Where’s Daddy?” asked Mary Foster.   
     “He’s at work, honey,” replied Mary’s mother, Julie.   
     “But it’s dinnertime. I thought he went to work in the morning and 
came home at dinnertime?” said Mary. 
      “Oh, he does. He makes auto parts at Mega Corporation but that’s his 
first job. Daddy now has two jobs.  He is a waiter in a restaurant from 5 
p.m. until 11 p.m.  so he can make enough money to pay the bills. Since 
Mega Corporation dropped health insurance for its employees, Daddy had 
to buy health insurance from the state health insurance exchange,” replied 
Mary’s mother.  
      “But when will I see Daddy?” asked Mary.  
      “We’ll see him on weekends before noon. Daddy’s second job means 
he waits on tables on weekends when customers give big tips, so he can’t 
be with us Saturday and Sunday afternoons and most nights, but we will 
see him Saturday and Sunday mornings,” answered  
Mary’s mother.” 
     “Daddy works a lot, doesn’t he, Mommy?” asked Mary.  
     “Yes, he does. But don’t forget, honey, he works for a company that 
provides jobs for its workers. Mega respects its workers and appreciates 
their work for the company. His job at Mega pays the mortgage and taxes 
on our house.” 
     “Look, it’s Daddy. He’s come home early to eat dinner with us,” said 
Mary. 
     Mary’s father entered the house and stared at Mary and Julie. “The 
plant is closing. I’ve lost my job at Mega, along with all the other 
workers.” 
 
Introduction 
The Economist magazine has asserted that the dominant principle 
of contemporary economics is comparative advantage,3 which is seen as 
the theoretical underpinning of international trade.4 Although 
contemporary economists often ignore David Ricardo’s contribution,5 he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See The Economics of Free Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 1990, at 16-18. 
4 JAMES GOLDSMITH, THE TRAP 15-16 (1994). 
5 See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS index (2002) (where no 
mention of David Ricardo can be found in the index of this book on economic 
globalization).  
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is credited with having developed the doctrine of comparative advantage 
over 150 years ago.6  When Ricardo developed the doctrine, he made a 
rational, but not empirical, defense of this theory. This paper aims to 
determine whether the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter 
NAFTA) experience provides empirical support for the theory of 
comparative advantage.   
 NAFTA7 has been in effect since 1994—almost a generation. It 
was controversial even prior to its taking effect8 and was a major issue 
during the 1992 United States presidential election.  NAFTA is a free 
trade agreement9 among Canada, Mexico, and the U.S., which came into 
effect in the United States on January 1, 1994.10  NAFTA has six 
objectives,11 the major one being (and the focus of this paper) the 
elimination of trade barriers (thereby enhancing trade in goods and 
services among the parties).12 Moreover, the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act13 reiterates the Agreement’s objectives. 
Politicians commenting on NAFTA objectives have identified other 
factors, arguably implicit in reducing trade barriers, such as economic 
growth, more equality, greater environmental protection, and ensuring 
peace.14As such, it could be said that NAFTA is founded on the 
philosophy that free trade improves the living and employment standards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 131-161 
(3d ed. 1821). 
7  North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
8  See ROSS PEROT WITH PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY 
NAFTA SHOULD BE STOPPED—NOW! Hyperion (1993). 
9 The Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (1972) (stating that  NAFTA is styled an 
“agreement” rather than a “treaty.” Executive agreements with other countries are 
authorized by the President’s executive authority and do not require 2/3 Senate approval 
as do treaties under the U.S. Constitution article 2, section 2.  However executive 
agreements signed by the President become law once signed by the President or his/her 
representative without Senate approval, although the President must notify the Senate of 
such executive agreement within 60 days of its signing).  
10 The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 
107 Stat. 2057 (1993). 
11 NAFTA, supra note 7, at §102.  
12 Id. (Other NAFTA objectives include the promotion of conditions of fair competition 
within the free trade area, the increase of investment opportunities within the area, the 
provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property in each Party’s 
territory, provision for dispute resolution, provision for a framework to implement and 
enforce the agreement, and provision for expanding the agreement). 
13  The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).  
14 See Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act, 29 WKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOC., 2511, 2548 (1993) (where 
President Clinton stated….  I believe we have made a decision now that will permit us to 
create an economic order in the world that will promote more growth, more equality, 
better preservation of the environment, and greater possibility of world peace …).  
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of those living in nations adhering to its free trade philosophy.15 
Therefore, NAFTA is a candidate to test Ricardian trade ideas.   
  NAFTA is a good candidate to test Ricardo’s comparative 
advantage for three reasons: first, NAFTA has a small number of member 
nations;16 second, considerable data is available to test whether the 
NAFTA nations have registered quantifiable gains following NAFTA’s 
passage; 17 and third, free trade has become a shibboleth, but because 
NAFTA is seen as a job-killer in the U.S. and as undermining 
environmental goals, there needs to be close scrutiny of NAFTA’s effects 
on its members’ economies to see if it lives up to its objectives.18 
      Following the discussion of Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage, there is a demographic profile of the three NAFTA nations in 
1993 (the year preceding NAFTA’s taking effect) and 2012, following 
nineteen years of NAFTA’s existence.19 Later there is a discussion of trade 
among NAFTA nations before and after NAFTA came into effect, to 
determine whether NAFTA has achieved its major goal. Other areas that 
NAFTA would logically affect are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per 
capita GDP and the purchasing power parity of NAFTA citizenry, 
unemployment levels, inflation, GINI indices, and manufacturing hourly 
wages. Each will be examined.  
      A major criticism of international trade is that it exacts human and 
environmental costs. To address environmental and labor concerns, the 
NAFTA nations adopted two “side” agreements—one on environmental 
matters, and the other regarding labor issues.20 These side agreements are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Id. at 2549.  (Now we must recognize that the only way for a wealthy nation to grow 
richer is to export, to simply find new customers for the products and services it makes 
… But we know that over the long run, our ability to have our internal economic policies 
work for the benefit of our people requires us to have external economic policies that 
permit productivity to find expression not simply in higher incomes for our businesses 
but in more jobs and higher incomes for our people). 
16 There are three NAFTA nations—Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. Compare this with the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which has over 150 member nations. 
17 See infra notes 23-47 and others providing a plethora of information about nations. 
18 But see, Daniel Griswold, By Every Reasonable Measure, NAFTA Has Been a Success, 
CATO INSTITUTE (2002), available at www.cato.org/publications/commentary/every-
reasonable-measure-nafta-has-been-success;contra, Julian Aguilar, Twenty Years Later, 
NAFTA Remains a Source of Tension, N.Y. TIMES (2012), available at  
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/us/twenty-years-later-nafta-remains-a-source-of-
tension.html?_r=0. 
19Generally, the years used in this study are 1993, the year prior to NAFTA’s taking 
effect, and 2012, the most recent year where there is comprehensive, comparative 
information on the three NAFTA nations.  However, occasionally, years other than 1993 
and 2012 are used to assess NAFTA’s efficacy when reliable data are unavailable.  For 
example, data for a particular measure—GINI indices—were not created until a later 
date. See infra note 67 and related text.  
20 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.  14, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 1480; see also North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, 
32 I.L.M. 1499.   
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discussed by scholars elsewhere,21 and readers are referred to these 
articles. In the name of economy of inquiry, several proxies for worker 
costs are examined to see if practical evidence of such burdens exists. In 
the area of environmental performance, an index is presented to evaluate 
environmental criticisms.   
     Finally, NAFTA exists in a world where the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) free trade ethos is nearly universal. Thus, a 
comparison is made to see how NAFTA nations have fared economically 
vis-à-vis their non-NAFTA counterparts during the period of NAFTA’s 
existence.  The impact of a nation’s currency on international trade is 
noted. 
I. WHAT IS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE? 
David Ricardo is credited with first developing the comparative 
advantage theory in his treatise, On the Principles of Political Economy 
and Taxation.22 Ricardo hypothesized that if there are two nations making 
two products, even if one nation is absolutely more efficient in making 
both products, it would benefit both nations if the nation relatively more 
efficient in making one product made that product leaving it to the other 
nation to make the other product and then trade amongst themselves. The 
idea is that each nation is better off making what it is relatively more 
efficient in producing. As such, Ricardo’s theory encourages and justifies 
free trade. Presumably, a nation should be wealthier as a result of free 
trade and its culture should be improved. 
      One aspect of Ricardian thinking is the key role of labor. 
According to Ricardo, labor establishes value. As such, this study 
examines what has happened to labor workers under NAFTA’s free trade 
ethos. What has happened to manufacturing jobs, hourly wages, the cost of 
living, and other measures of overall stress and stability in workers’ lives?   
      Ricardo’s theory has some obvious limitations. For example, the 
world is composed of many nations, making many products; so 
ascertaining what each is relatively most efficient in producing is 
problematic. Add to this currency differences and one begins to see how 
difficult it is to evaluate Ricardo’s theory. The present study reduces some 
of these problems because NAFTA only involves three nations—Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States—so comparisons of certain macro-
economic data points enable one to determine if, after implementation, 
each of the three nations is better off.  Also this study uses the U.S. dollar 
as the single currency to compare different nation’s economic data, 
thereby eliminating currency issues.  
Perhaps the greatest limitation of Ricardo’s theory is that he seems 
to assume that the benefits of international trade are spread evenly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See infra note 93. 
22 RICARDO, supra note 6. 
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throughout a nation. In keeping with Ricardo’s emphasis on labor, this 
study examines whether NAFTA benefits are evenly beneficial to all 
segments of society or if they accrue disproportionately to certain 
segments, such as the managerial/professional class. 
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE THREE NAFTA 
NATIONS 
Table 1 outlines some of the basic facts concerning the relative 
physical size,23 populations,24 and GDP of the three NAFTA nations for 
the year prior to NAFTA’s taking effect (1993)25 and the end year of this 
study (2012).26 
Table 1:  Background Data on NAFTA Nations 
Nation Land area Population 
1993 
Population 
2012 
GDP 
1993 
GDP 
2012 
Canada 9985 K 
sq. km. 
27.8 
million 
34.7 
million 
$575 Bn 
(US) 
$1,780       
Bn (US) 
      
Mexico 1964 K 
sq. km 
86.7 
million 
116.1 
million 
$325 Bn 
(US) 
$1,178       
Bn (US) 
      
United States 9629 K 
sq. km. 
258.1 
million 
315.8 
million 
$6388 
Bn 
$16,245   
Bn 
 
       The U.S. economy dwarfs the other two NAFTA members, as it 
was about 11 times greater than Canada’s economy in 1993 and about 
twenty times that of Mexico’s in the same year. By 2012, the U.S. 
economy was still much larger than either of its partners, but not by quite 
as much. By 2012, Canada’s economy was about one-eighth of the U.S. 
economy, while Mexico’s economy was about one-fourteenth of the size 
of the U.S. economy in the same year. Relative size had slightly shifted to 
the two smaller economies. Remarkably, Canada, which has less than one-
third of Mexico’s population, nonetheless has a GDP over 50 percent 
higher than that of Mexico.  
     All three economies increased substantially between 1993 and 
2012. Canada’s GDP grew from $575 billion (U.S. dollars) in 1993 to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 ANDREA BURGESS ET AL., THE ECONOMIST POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 12 (2015 ed. 
2014). 
24 ANDREW BEVAN ET AL., THE ECONOMIST POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 14 (1996 ed. 
1995) (for 1993 populations); see also BURGESS, supra note 23, at 14 (for 2012 
populations).  
25 BEVAN, supra note 24. 
26 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 24. 
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$1,780 billion in 2012—approximately tripling.  Mexico’s GDP grew 
similarly. It went from $325 billion (U.S. dollars) in 1993 to $1,178 billion 
in 2012—about a 3 1/2 increase from 1993. The U.S.’s economy also 
increased considerably also from $6,388 billion to $16,245 billion in 
2012—roughly increasing by 2.5 times, thereby registering the smallest 
rate of increase of all three NAFTA nations. 
      The populations of the three NAFTA countries told a slightly 
different story with Canada’s population increasing about 7 million or 
about 25% while Mexico’s grew about 28.1 million, roughly 33%; thus 
the larger, poorer Mexican population grew even faster than the smaller, 
wealthier Canadian population.27 The U.S. population also increased by 
about 60 million, about 25%, roughly the same as Canada’s percentage 
gain, but behind the rate of increase of Mexico. 
 Although it is not as significant as the economic data, the physical 
size of Canada exceeded that of its partners, just slightly larger than the 
U.S. and about five times the square kilometers of Mexico.  Canada is the 
third largest nation in the world in land area, and Canadians are 
recognizing a natural resource competitive edge,28 due in part to its size. 
Regardless, there was no change in the physical size of any NAFTA 
nation in the period under study.   
 
III. STRUCTURE OF NAFTA NATIONS’ ECONOMIES 
PRE- AND POST NAFTA 
      Economists have long recognized an evolution in the structure of a 
nation’s economy as it moves from being under-developed to a mature 
society. Initially, the nation’s economy is an agriculture-dominated 
economy, followed by movement away from agriculture to manufacturing, 
and finally shifting to a predominantly service-based economy.29 Table 2 
presents the data for structure of economies of the three NAFTA nations, 
both pre and post NAFTA, to see if, in fact, the NAFTA experience 
generally supports this posited sequence.30   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See infra note 30 and associated text. 
28 See BURGESS, supra note 23, at 55 (Canada is ranked 3rd in the world in terms of 
proven oil reserves behind only Venezuela (1st) and Saudi Arabia (2nd). Canada also ranks 
5th in natural gas production and oil production). 
29 See generally Christopher Conte & Albert R. Karr, Labor in America: The 
Worker's Role, USEMBASSY, available at 
http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/oecon/chap9.htm. 
30BEVAN, supra note 24, at 106 (for Canada), 154 (for Mexico), and 206 (for the US); 
BURGESS, supra note 23, at 128 (for Canada), 180 (for Mexico), and 236 (for the US). 
Percentages do not always add up to 100% due to ECONOMIST breakdown for 
“Industry” in different years into subcategories for “manufacturing” and “mining” or a 
general “industry” category other than manufacturing for some years.  
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Table 2:  Structure of the Economies of NAFTA Nations  
Pre- and Post NAFTA 
Nation 1993 Agric.; 
Mfg.; 
Services % 
 2012 Agric.; 
Mfg.; 
Services % 
  
Canada Ag. 3.1%;  
Mfg. 22.1%; 
Services 
66.2% 
 Ag. 2.4%; 
Mfg/Industry  
21.5%; 
Services 
76.5% 
  
      
Mexico Ag. 7.4%; 
Mfg. 22.4%; 
Services 
59.8% 
 Ag. 13.4%; 
Mfg./Mining 
24.1%; 
Services 
61.9% 
  
      
USA Ag.1.8%; 
Mfg. 17.9%; 
Services74.9
% 
 Ag. 1.6%; 
Mfg. 16.7%; 
Services 
81.2% 
  
 
        The data in Table 2 generally supports economists’ conventional 
wisdom about stages of economic development, although some data runs 
counter to expectations. Specifically, the 1993 data refers to origins for 
GDP (not necessarily the same thing as structure of employment, but 
similar) whereas the 2012 data does refer to the structure of employment. 
One would expect all three NAFTA nations to record decreases in 
agriculture and manufacturing with increases in the percentage of the 
service sector of the economies of each nation as we move from 1993 to 
2012. The service sector did increase in all three nations from 1993 to 
2012, albeit very slightly in the case of Mexico. The agriculture sector 
decreased in Canada and the U.S. from 1993 to 2012, but nearly doubled 
in Mexico, the poorest NAFTA nation, going from 7.4% in 1993 to 13.4% 
in 2012. 
 With respect to the manufacturing sector, economists’ projections 
about sectoral shifts found some support in the NAFTA experience.  
Specifically, Canada and the U.S. both had slight declines in 
manufacturing—Canada going from 22.1% to 21.5% and the U.S. 
manufacturing sector dropped from 17.9% in 1993 to 16.7% in 2012—
both declines of approximately 3% and 7% respectively. Mexico bucked 
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the declining manufacturing trend by increasing from 22.9% to 24.1% 
during the 1993 to 2012 period—an approximate 5% increase.  Thus 
Canada and the U.S. support conventional economic thought about the 
direction of manufacturing as an economy matures, while Mexico does 
not. 
         NAFTA, generally, but not always, supports traditional views 
about the evolution of a nation’s economic structure as it moves from an 
under-developed to a mature economy. 
IV. NAFTA IMPACT ON FREE TRADE BETWEEN 
MEMBER NATIONS 
      A major stated goal of NAFTA is to remove trade barriers among 
member nations.31  The question is: has trade among the three NAFTA 
nations increased since NAFTA’s inception? First, trade prior to 1993 will 
be examined.     
A. Trade Levels of NAFTA Nations before NAFTA’s Passage 
      Even before NAFTA’s inception, trade among the NAFTA nations 
was strong with the U.S., but not between Canada and Mexico. For 
example, in 1993, Mexico’s main export markets were the U.S., which 
accounted for 83% of Mexico’s total exports and Canada, which 
accounted for 3% of Mexico’s total exports.32 Thus 86% of Mexico’s 
exports prior to NAFTA were to what would become the other NAFTA 
nations.  Mexican imports in 1991 told a slightly different story because 
Canada provided only <1.4% of Mexico’s imports.33  However, in 1991 
the U.S. provided 70% of Mexico’s imports.34 
      As expected, Canada traded heavily with the U.S. in 1991, with 
62.3% of its imports being of U.S. origin, but Mexico was not a significant 
source of Canadian imports being less than Japan (4.9%), the U.K. (2.6%), 
Germany (2.3%), and South Korea (1.3%).35 Canada exported the bulk of 
its products (80.3%) to the U.S. followed by exports to Japan (4.4%), the 
U.K. (1.6%), Germany (1.5%), and South Korea (0.9%).36 Thus, prior to 
NAFTA, Canada and Mexico traded very little. 
      Before the entrance of NAFTA in 1993, the U.S.’s largest export 
market was Canada (22.1% of the U.S.’s exports), followed by Japan 
(10.2%), Mexico (9.6%), the U.K. (5.6%), Germany (4.0%), and Taiwan 
(3.4%).37 The U.S. imported the most from Canada (19.2%), Japan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 NAFTA §102(a)(2). 
32 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 155. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 107. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 207. 
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(18.2%), Mexico (6.9%), China (5.4%), Germany (4.8%), and Taiwan 
(4.3%).38 Thus, Canada and Mexico represented significant portions of 
U.S. imports and exports, but the U.S.’s trade—both imports and 
exports—was split more evenly among several nations than were either 
Canada’s or Mexico’s. Neither Canada nor Mexico was more than 22% of 
U.S. trade in either 1993 or 2012. 
      By 2012, there was a considerable shift in trade for NAFTA 
nations, and based on percentage, this shift was not necessarily in favor of 
NAFTA nations.  The U.S., the largest NAFTA nation, exported the most 
to Canada (18.9%) and Mexico (14%),  representing a decline of exports 
to Canada from 1993,39 but the percentage of U.S. imports from Mexico 
rose from 6.9% to 12.3%. 40 
      Table 3 summarizes the trade imports and exports by percentages 
of trade represented in each NAFTA nation with the others in the year 
prior to NAFTA’s taking effect and in 2012. If increasing trade among 
NAFTA nations was a principal objective of NAFTA, then the percentage 
data on trade from 1991 to 2012 presented here generally does not support 
an achievement of this goal. Specifically, imports of Canada from the U.S. 
declined significantly from 62.3% to 50.6% as a percentage of all U.S. 
imports.  Similarly, Mexican imports from the US dropped from 70.7% to 
54.9%. Also, exports from Canada to the U.S. dropped from 75.8% to 
74.5% in 2012. Mexican exports to the U.S. likewise rose as a percentage 
of all Mexican exports from 74.5% to 77.6%. Also, there was a very slight 
increase in import trade between Mexico and Canada—but this was slight 
going from <1.4% to <4.0% in the case of Canadian imports to Mexico.  
Table 3:  Trade between NAFTA nations in 1991 and 2012 in 
Percentage Change 
Nation Percent of 
its total 
Imports 
1991 
Percent of 
its total 
imports 
2012 
Percent of 
its total 
exports 
1991 
Percent of 
its total 
exports 
2012 
 
Canada From 
U.S.: 
62.3% 
From 
U.S.: 
50.6% 
To U.S.: 
75.8% 
To U.S.: 
74.5% 
 
 From 
Mexico: 
<1.4% 
From 
Mexico: 
5.5% 
To:  
Mexico: 
<1.3% 
To: 
Mexico: 
<2.3% 
 
Mexico From 
Canada: 
:<1.4% 
From 
Canada: 
<4.0% 
To 
Canada: 
5.5% 
To 
Canada: 
3.0% 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. 
39 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 237. 
40 Id. 
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 From 
U.S.: 
70.7% 
From 
U.S.: 
54.9% 
To U.S.: 
74.5% 
To U.S.: 
77.6% 
 
U.S. From 
Canada 
18.5%; 
From 
Mexico: 
6.6% 
From: 
Canada 
14.4%; 
From: 
Mexico: 
12.3% 
To 
Canada: 
20.2%; 
To: 
Mexico: 
9.0% 
To 
Canada:  
18.9%; 
To 
Mexico: 
12.3% 
— 
 
1. Dollar Value of Trade of NAFTA Nations for Years 1993 and 
2012:  Effect of Reducing NAFTA Trade Barriers  
       The imports and exports between each NAFTA nation, in 
percentages of each nation’s total trade, show (with some exceptions) 
declines from 1993 to 2012. Such declines suggest NAFTA has generally 
had a negative impact on trade between NAFTA’s nations following its 
adoption.  This runs counter to Ricardian notions that reduction in trade 
barriers increases—not reduces—trade.   
B. Dollar Comparisons of Imports between NAFTA nations 
before and after NAFTA. 
 There is another way of looking at the evolution of trade between 
NAFTA nations following NAFTA’s passage by examining trade in 
absolute dollar amounts. In 1991, Canada had total principal imports of 
$139.3 billion and total principal exports of $145.7 billion.41  In dollar 
terms, Canadian imports from the U.S. in 1991 were $86.73 billion. 
Canadian imports from Mexico in 1991 were less than $1.95 billion. By 
2012, total Canadian imports from all nations were $474.9 billion, of 
which $240.3 billion were from the U.S. and $26.12 billion were from 
Mexico. Thus, unlike the percentage analysis, in dollars, trade between all 
NAFTA nations increased substantially following NAFTA’s taking effect. 
       In dollar terms, Mexico had $38.2 billion in total imports in 
1991,42 which grew to $370.8 billion in principal imports in 2012.43 
Mexican imports from Canada in 1991, in dollars, totaled less than $535 
million, but by 2012, Mexico had increased its imports from Canada to 
less than $14.45 billion—approximately a $14 billion increase over the 
life of NAFTA. Clearly, reduction of trade barriers aided trade expansion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 ANDREW BEVAN ET AL., THE ECONOMIST POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 100 (1994 ed. 
1993). These figures are in Canadian dollars, which were worth considerably less than 
the U.S. dollar in 1995. 
42 Id. at 149. 
43 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 181. 
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Trade increase in dollars was even greater in the case of Mexican imports 
from the U.S., which jumped from $46.49 billion in 1991 to $203.57 
billion in 2012—a $157 billion increase.  Even though Mexican imports 
from the U.S. dropped from 71.1% to 54.9% of Mexico’s total imports in 
the NAFTA years, the dollar amount increased by over $157 billion—a 
four times increase.   
      Total U.S. imports were $589.4 billion in 1991 and grew to $2.276 
trillion in 2012. The U.S. imports from Canada between 1993 and 2012 
dropped significantly in percentage terms but rose significantly in dollar 
terms. In 1991, the U.S. imported $98.51 billion from Canada.  By 2012, 
the U.S. imported $327.64 billion from Canada—almost three times the 
dollar amount prior to NAFTA. The U.S. experienced similar results with 
imports from Mexico. In 1991, U.S. imports from Mexico were $35.14 
billion and rose to $279.87 billion—approximately seven times the pre-
NAFTA figures but still less than the level of U.S. imports from Canada. 
Nonetheless, the large dollar increases in U.S. imports from both Mexico 
and Canada post-NAFTA supports the freer trade under NAFTA.   
C.  Dollar Comparisons of Exports between NAFTA nations 
before and after NAFTA.    
The exports from one NAFTA nation to another also increased 
significantly between 1993 and 2012—the period following NAFTA’s 
taking effect. In the case of Canada, total exports to all nations were 
$164.6 billion in 1993.44 This figure grew to $462.9 billion in 2012.45 In 
1991, Canada exported $110.44 billion to the U.S. and less than $1.89 
billion to Mexico.46 By 2012, Canada exported $344.86 billion to the U.S. 
and less than $10.64 billion to Mexico.47 These substantial increases in 
Canadian exports to the U.S. and Mexico in 2012 compared to 1991 
support the assertion that freer trade increased the absolute dollar 
magnitude of trade among NAFTA nations. 
      Mexican exports to Canada and the U.S. also grew substantially 
between 1991 and 2012. In 1991 total Mexican exports to all nations was 
$27.1 billion. About $1.55 billion went to Canada and $42.99 billion went 
to the U.S. By 2012, total Mexican exports were $370.7 billion of which 
$11.12 billion went to Canada and $287.66 billion to the U.S.   
       The data for dollar trade for the U.S. between 1991 and 2012 also 
suggests that reducing trade barriers between those years sharply increased 
trade. Thus, in 1991, the U.S. principal exports to all nations was $422.2 
billion, of which Canada represented 20.2% or $85.28 billion.48  By 2012, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 107. 
45 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 129. 
46 FIONA COOPER ET AL., THE ECONOMIST POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 101 (1994 ed. 
1993). 
47 Id. 
48 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 207. 
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U.S. principal exports to all nations were $1,595.7 billion of which 
Canada represented 18.9% (a percentage decline from 1991) but a dollar 
level of $292.13 billion—almost three times the 1991 level in dollar 
terms.49  U.S. exports to Mexico in 1991 were $37.99 billion, but by 2012 
they shot up to $216.3 billion. The NAFTA years saw an almost five-fold 
increase in U.S. exports to Mexico.    
      Clearly, dollar level of trade between the U.S. and Canada 
increased substantially between 1991 and 2012, again suggesting that as 
barriers to trade between these two NAFTA nations were declining, trade 
in absolute dollar amount increased sharply, which could be attributed at 
least in part to NAFTA.   
       Finally, increased dollar levels of trade between Mexico and 
Canada and Mexico and the U.S. in absolute dollar terms also suggest a 
decline in trade barriers. For example, Mexico’s principal exports in 1991 
were $27.1 billion of which the U.S. represented 74.5% or $20.18 billion 
while Canada accounted for 5.5% or $1.355 billion.50 By 2012, total 
principal Mexican exports had risen to $370.7 billion of which the U.S. 
accounted for 77.6% or $287.66 billion, and Canada accounted for 3.0% 
of the total or $11.49 billion.51  The data for 1991 and 2012 shows that in 
dollar terms Mexican exports to other NAFTA nations substantially 
(exports to the U.S. increasing almost seven times and to Canada almost 
seventy times) increased thereby permitting the inference that NAFTA’s 
reduction in trade barriers accounted for at least some of the increased 
dollar trade.   
Table 4:  Changes in Trade from 1991 to 2012 between NAFTA 
Nations in Dollar Terms 
Country Total 
imports  in 
$ terms 
1991 
Total 
imports in 
$ terms 
2012 
Total 
exports in 
$ terms 
1991 
Total 
exports in 
$ terms 
2012 
 
Canada From U.S.:  
$86.78 
billion 
From U.S.: 
$240.3 
billion 
To U.S.:  
$110.44 
billion 
To U.S.: 
$344.86 
billion 
 
 From 
Mexico: 
<$1.95 
billion 
From 
Mexico 
$26.12 
billion 
To Mexico:  
< $1.89 
billion 
To Mexico: 
< $10.64 
billion 
 
Mexico From 
Canada:  
$535 
From 
Canada: 
less than 
To Canada: 
$1.355 
billion 
To Canada;  
$11.12 
billion 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 237. 
50 COOPER, supra note 46, at 149. 
51 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 181. 
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billion $14.45 
billion 
 From U.S.: 
$46.49 
billion 
From U.S.:  
$203.57 
billion 
To U.S.:  
$20.18 
billion 
To U.S.: 
$287.66 
billion 
 
U.S. From 
Canada: 
$98.51 
billion; 
From 
Mexico 
$35.14 
billion 
From 
Canada: 
$327.13 
billion; 
From 
Mexico: 
$279.87 
billion 
To Canada: 
$85.28 
billion 
To Mexico: 
$37.99  
billion 
To Canada:  
$292.13 
billion; 
To Mexico: 
$216.3 
billion 
 
 
V. PER CAPITA DATA OF NAFTA NATIONS PRE- AND 
POST NAFTA 
       As noted above, macro data for NAFTA nations generally 
supports the idea that free trade improved economic welfare of NAFTA 
nations from 1991 to 2012.  Does the same hold true for individuals in 
NAFTA nations?  This section provides some answers. It breaks down the 
data into per capita terms so one can see how hypothetical “average” 
individuals fared under NAFTA:  per capita GDP;52 Purchasing Power 
Parity; Human Development Index (HDI) quality of life indices; and, 
thanks to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the GINI index, 
which exposes whether wealth is equally distributed across each nation. 
To the extent they are available; these measures of individual economic 
welfare are presented pre and post NAFTA to study possible NAFTA 
effects. 
Table 5:  GDP per capita comparisons pre- and post NAFTA 
Nation Per  cap 
GDP  
1991 
Per cap 
GDP 2012 
World 
rank GDP 
1991 
World 
Rank 
GDP 2012 
 
Canada $21,254 $51,206 11 16  
      
Mexico $2,874 $9,750 54 Not in top 
60 
 
      
U.S. $22,560 $51,749 9 14  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 BEVAN, supra note 41, at 149 (for 1991 per capita GDP); see BURGESS, supra note 23, 
at 26 (for 2012 per capita GDP).  
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      Table 5 presents a mixed picture of economic success for NAFTA 
nations regarding per capita GDP. Data supporting NAFTA includes the 
fact that all three NAFTA nations more than doubled their GDP per capita 
between 1991 and 2012. The above figures support the Ricardian notion 
that freer trade improves the economic situation for individuals among all 
trading partners. However, attributing GDP growth to freer trade could be 
assigning to one factor an outcome resulting from various other causes, 
such as technological growth or quality of the goods produced. Thus, care 
must be taken not to fall into the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.53   
      Unfortunately, the world rank regarding per capita GDP of the 
three NAFTA nations declined vis-à-vis the other nations. All three 
NAFTA nations fell in per capita world rank from 9th to 14th for the U.S., 
from 11th to 16th for Canada, and from 54th to out of the top 60 for Mexico.  
Canada approached the U.S. in per capita GDP in 2012 decreasing $543 
below the U.S.  
       Mexican per capita GDP increased over three times, but the 
relatively weak showing of Mexican per capita GDP terms compared to 
other nations raises questions about the value of free trade from the 
average (or below average) person’s perspective.  This showing also 
undermines one of NAFTA’s resolutions in its preamble: “…[to] improve 
working conditions and living standard in their respective territories.”54 
A. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)55 and Human Development 
Index (HDI) 
      It is possible that more sophisticated indices could cast a different 
light on the picture of stagnation and relative decline in Mexico’s and the 
U.S.’s per capita GDP shown above. A more refined view of individuals’ 
economic situation accounts for the purchasing power of their income. 
Thus, if one’s income doubles, but the overall national price level for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 That is, “after this, therefore because of this.”  An example of the post hoc ergo propter 
hoc fallacy would be “It rained the day I took the economics test, and I scored poorly.  
Therefore, when it rains, I do poorly on exams,” even though a more plausible reason is 
that I did not study sufficiently for the exam.  
54 North American Free Trade Agreement, pmbl., U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
55 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, The CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2013 xxi (Skyhorse 
Publishing 2012) (stating that “…A nation’s GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) 
exchange rates is the sum value of all goods and services produced in the country valued 
at prices prevailing in the United States in the year noted.  This is the measure most 
economists prefer when looking at per capita welfare and when comparing living 
conditions or use of resources across countries.  The measure is difficult to compute, as a 
US dollar value has to be assigned to all goods and services in the economy regardless of 
whether goods and services have a direct equivalent in the United States (for example the 
value of an ox-cart or non-US military equipment; as a result, PPP estimates for some 
countries are based on a small and sometimes different set of goods and services”). 
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goods and services also doubles during the same period, it cannot be said 
that one is better off economically.   
     The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) index recognizes the impact of 
price level rises on individuals’ economic well-being.  Thus, one might 
rightly ask what has been the impact of the PPP following the introduction 
of NAFTA?  Table 6 below provides some answers between years 1995 
and 2012. 
1. PPP Index 
In terms of PPP, the three NAFTA nations, Canada somewhat 
declined, and Mexico dropped significantly (Canada from 89.756 to 79.857 
and Mexico fell off a cliff going from a PPP of 27.6 (tie for 48th) in 
199158 to 31.7 (out of the top 60) in 2012.59  Again, as with per capita 
GDP, Canada and Mexico did not do well.  The U.S.’s apparently stable 
PPP of 100 both in 1991 and 2012 can be attributed to its function as the 
never-changing benchmark economy.  However, the U.S. fell from first 
place in PPP in 199160 pre-NAFTA to twelfth place in 2012,61 indicating a 
weaker economy.  
       Changes in the PPP index pre- and post NAFTA indicate that 
individuals in all three NAFTA nations were worse off vis-à-vis their 
peers in other nations following NAFTA’s adoption.  Disturbingly, 
Mexico, the poorest NAFTA nation, did fare worse than its two richer 
partners, the U.S. and Canada, when adjusted price levels were taken into 
account.62  If free trade is theoretically so economically beneficial, how 
can the aforementioned developments occur? The discussion below under 
the GINI Index provides some answers. 
2. HDI Index  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 25. 
57 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 27. 
58 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 25. The year 1991 is used due to a lack of a data for the end 
of 1993. 
59 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 180. 
60 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 25 
61 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 28. 
62  See Wage Theft Charts, THE JUS SEMPER GLOBAL ALLIANCE (2014), available at  
http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Labour%20Resources/WGC-
AEM/Resources/Wage_gap_chartsAEM.pdf (“…Since costs of living in PPPs terms in 
Mexico…[is] $0.68….for each $1 U.S. dollar, equivalent Mexican…manufacturing 
workers should be earning instead $24, $25/hour…in order to enjoy equal purchasing 
power compensation….A classic example in 2009:  …The nominal equalized wage of 
$16.70 is what the Mexican production line worker should earn to be equally 
compensated in purchasing power terms for performing an equivalent task.  Yet the 
worker only earns $3.81 instead of $16.70; thus the employer deliberately retains $12.89, 
which constitutes the greater part of the surplus value that legitimately belongs to the 
Mexican worker, according to TLWNSI’s concept. “)  
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There is more to life than economics. A nation’s citizens need 
education so they can read and write.  They need medical care so they can 
live long, productive lives. The United Nation’s Human Development 
Index (HDI)63 recognizes such concerns.  HDI adds life expectancy and 
literacy to GDP per capita to give a broader, albeit far from perfect, 
picture of quality of life for a nation’s individuals. As such, life 
expectancy is a somewhat crude measure of a nation’s health care, while 
literacy is likewise a rather blunt tool to measure a nation’s education 
system.  Thus, HDI takes account of economic income, health care, and 
educational attainment for individuals.   
Here, again, all three NAFTA nations fell in their world ranking 
pre-NAFTA to 2013.64 The U.S. dropped only slightly, going from an HDI 
of 94 (2nd place) in 199365 to 91.4 (5th place) in 201366. Canada fell even 
further in the HDI rankings, from a 95.1 HDI (1st) in 199367 to 90.2 (8th) in 
201368. Mexico, the least developed NAFTA nation, where one might 
hope for the most improvement, instead, saw its HDI decline from 84.5 
(46th)69 to entirely out of the top 60.70  In terms of the UN HDI ranking 
system, both Canada and the U.S. are still considered to have very high 
human development despite their HDI slippage between 1993 and 2013, 
since they have HDI numbers over 80. Mexico, on the other hand, fell 
from very high human development in 1993 (HDI of 84.5) to outside the 
top 60 nations for the same period, thereby moving from very high to high 
human development. 
      The HDI data is notable because it is more inclusive (covering 
income, education, and health care) than, for example, per capita GDP. 
The decline in HDI signifies several sectors of society are dropping 
relative to other nations.  The declines in the Human Development Index 
is the strongest evidence so far that joining NAFTA has not advanced the 
health, literacy, or income of the average person relative to the experience 
in nations outside NAFTA.71 It is ammunition for those who assert that 
international trade does not benefit society in general, which includes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See BURGESS, supra note 23, at 28 (GDP or GDP per head is often taken as a measure 
of how developed a country is, but its usefulness is limited as it refers only to economic 
welfare.  The UN Development Program combines statistics on average and expected 
years of schooling and life expectancy with income levels (now GNI per head, valued in 
PPP US $).  The HDI is shown here scaled from 0 to 100; countries scoring over 80 are 
considered to have very high human development, 67-79 high, 50-66  medium, and those 
under 50 low).  
64 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 26. 
65 ROBERT EVES ET AL., THE ECONOMIST POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 26 (1998 ed. 1997). 
66 BURGESS , supra note 23, at 20. 
67 EVES, supra note 65. 
68 BURGESS , supra note 23, at 20.   
69 EVES, supra note 65.  
70 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 28. 
71 Of course, some would argue that had there been no NAFTA the performance of 
NAFTA nations relative to other nations would have been even worse. 
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average person. The fact that Ricardian theory is based on the importance 
of labor and the implicit need to support the laboring class, these HDI data 
are doubly damning because they undermine an inference from Ricardo’s 
theory that international trade benefits the entire society. 
Table 6:  Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for NAFTA Nations 
1991 and 2011 and Human Development Index (HDI) 1993 and 2012 
 
Nation 1991  
PPP (& 
world 
rank) 
2012 PPP 2012 PPP 
world 
rank 
1993 HDI 
(& world 
rank) 
2013 
HDI (& 
world 
rank) 
Canada 89.7 (6) 84 23 95.1 (1) 90.2 (8) 
      
Mexico 27.6 (43) 31.7 (not in 
top 68) 
84.5 (46) 76.6 
(outside 
top 60) 
      
United States 100 (1) 100 14 94 (2) 91.4 (5) 
 
3. The GINI Index:  a Measure of National Income Inequality.   
A frequent criticism of international trade is that it does not benefit 
all sectors of a nation’s economy because blue-collar manufacturing jobs 
are often shipped overseas by the managerial class to lower labor market 
costs.72 Thus., U.S., Canadian, and Mexican blue-collar workers could 
find themselves worse off following the institution of NAFTA. 
      Enter the GINI index, which provides an answer to the question of 
how much income inequality there is among differing income levels in 
society.73  This index ranges from 0.0 to 100.0. Perfect income equality is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 15-16; see also AGUILAR, supra note 18. 
73 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, The CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2013 xxi (Skyhorse 
Publishing 2012) (Distribution of Family Income—the GINI Index.  This index measures 
the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country.  The index is 
calculated from the Lorenz curve, of which cumulative family income is plotted against 
the number of families arranged from the poorest to the richest.  The index is the ratio of 
a) the area between the country’s Lorenz curve and the 45 degree helping line to b) the 
entire triangular area under the 45 degree line.  The more nearly equal a country’s income 
distribution, the closer its Lorenz curve to the 45 degree line and the lower the GINI 
index, e.g., a Scandinavian country with an index of 25.  The more unequal a country’s 
income distribution, the farther the Lorenz curve from the 45 degree line and the higher 
the GINI index, e.g., a Sub-Saharan country with an index of 50.  If income were 
distributed with perfect equality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the 45 degree line 
and the index would be zero.  If income were distributed with perfect inequality, the 
Lorenz curve would coincide with the horizontal axis and the right vertical axis and the 
index would be 100) [hereinafter CIA].  
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reflected in a GINI number of 0.0. A GINI index of 100 would show 
perfect income inequality.74 
      The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the source for GINI 
indices. The CIA ranks 138 nations from worst in terms of income 
inequality (1 for Namibia with a GINI of 70.7 in 2003) to best (134, 
Sweden with a GINI of 23.0 in 2005).75  The median GINI is 39.0 with a 
ranking of 67 held by the nation of Malawi.76 
      Among NAFTA nations, Canada had the least income inequality 
with a GINI coefficient of 32.1 in 2005, placing it 100th in terms of 
income inequality (at the top of the 2nd quartile or bottom of the top 
quartile).77 Since Canada has the least income inequality among NAFTA 
nations and barely reaches the top quartile of inequality, one can infer that 
NAFTA has not achieved the “equality” objective articulated at NAFTA’s 
U.S. adoption.78 
      Table 7 shows that Mexico had the most income inequality among 
NAFTA nations, Canada has the least inequality. The U.S. fared rather 
poorly, being only slightly better than Mexico, with both Mexico and the 
U.S. falling in the lower half of nations in terms of income inequality.79 
The GINI analysis suggests that NAFTA benefits have gone to higher 
income persons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act, supra note 14. There are limitations to GINI analysis. GINI numbers are available 
only for random years during NAFTA’s existence.  The matter of income inequality is 
significant in light of President Clinton’s prediction at the time of NAFTA’s signing that 
NAFTA would promote equality (however, Mr. Clinton did not specify whether he meant 
income equality or some other equality such as gender or racial equality).  
75 There are at least 195 nations. See CIA, supra note 73, at xiii (Independent States:  195 
list). Thus the CIA’s ranking of 134 nations for GINI purposes could omit nations having 
greater income disparity than the 134 for which GINI’s are calculated, which would 
improve Mexico’s and the U.S.’s positions on income disparity.   
76 The fourth quartile GINI range is from 70.7 to 46.8 and includes 33 countries 
(Madagascar is ranked 33 with a GINI of 47.5).  The third quartile range is 34 through 67 
(with Mozambique at 34 with a GINI of 47.3 and Malawi at 67 with a GINI of 39.0).  
The second quartile range is from 68 through 101 with Macedonia (ranked 68) having a 
GINI of 39.0 and Ireland ranked 101 with a GINI of 32).  The top quartile range is 102 
(Spain with a GINI of 32.0 and ends with Sweden at 134 with a GINI of 23.0).   
77 CIA, supra note 73, at 132. 
78 See Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act, supra notes 14 and 15. 
79 One would infer that socialist nations would have lower GINI coefficients (less income 
inequality) than capitalist nations.  This generally, but not always, proved true based on 
CIA data.  For example, China, purportedly a communist nation, had a GINI coefficient 
of 48—two points higher (thus showing greater inequality) than the capitalist U.S.’s 45 
(CIA supra note 73, at 773, both calculated near the same years—2009 for China and 
2007 for the US.  Russia, by comparison, had a GINI of 42 for year 2010 (Id. at 601), 
Japan a GINI of 37.6 for year 2008 (Id. at 375), and Germany a GINI of 27.0 for year 
2006 (Id. at 281) and France a 32.7 in year 2008 (Id. at 250).  One might conclude from 
these data that Germany is more socialist than France, Russia, or Japan.   
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Table 7 presents the most recent available GINI analysis from the 
U.S. CIA. It  indicates that the disparity in income levels in the two most 
developed NAFTA nations has risen slightly, indicating more disparity 
and less equity within these NAFTA nations. Mexican income disparity 
improved slightly but remained below the median for all nations. In CIA 
terms, Mexico fell in the Sub-Saharan nation class indicative of great 
inequality. 
Table 7:  GINI Indices for most recent years for NAFTA Nations 
Country Earliest 
GINI  
Index 
Most 
recent 
GINI 
Index 
   
Canada 31.5 
(1994) 
32.1 
(2005) 
   
      
Mexico 53.1 
(1998) 
51.7 
(2008) 
   
      
U.S. 40.7 
(1997) 
45 (2007)    
 
     Two of the three NAFTA nations (Mexico and the U.S.) ranked in 
the worst half of nations in terms of income inequality. Both nations have 
a GINI index approaching double that of the nation with the least income 
inequality (Sweden). This criticism is at odds with U.S. President 
Clinton’s statement of NAFTA’s objective being the promotion of 
equality.80  
       Income disparities based on GINI analysis should be qualified by 
noting that the GINI comparison years differed, so possibly the income 
inequality was not as bad as otherwise indicated, although it also could be 
worse. Nonetheless, the GINI numbers coupled with other indices of 
social and economic disparity such as the GDP per capita in PPP and HDI, 
indicate NAFTA’s economic and collateral benefits accrued unequally 
across the U.S. and Mexico.       
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act, supra note 14 and associated text. 
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VI. EMPLOYMENT LEVELS IN NAFTA NATIONS PRE- 
AND POST NAFTA 
       David Ricardo elevated labor to the preeminent position in 
economic analysis. Therefore, it is appropriate to observe that one 
objective of NAFTA was to increase trade, which could improve 
employment levels of member nations. The argument is: more 
international trade means more domestic jobs and lower unemployment 
levels.  
       Table 8 shows the unemployment levels of NAFTA nations in 
1993 and 2012. The data reveals that only one of the three NAFTA 
nations—Canada—improved its unemployment rate going from 11.4% in 
1993 to 7.2% in 2012. Both Mexico and the U.S. experienced higher 
unemployment rates, Mexico moving from 3.2% to 4.9%, and the U.S. 
from 6.9% to 8.1% from 1995 to 2012.81  As with other indices relating to 
individual welfare, NAFTA appears to have an unfavorable effect on 
unemployment, particularly because Mexico and the U.S. both have much 
larger populations than Canada—the one nation experiencing a decline in 
unemployment following the years of NAFTA. Even Canada’s 2012 
unemployment rate is not low at 6.3%, so the idea that free trade lowers 
unemployment finds little support in the data here. 
      Despite the increase in unemployment from 1993 to 2012 in 
Mexico and the U.S., there are positive aspects to this data. First, Mexico 
had a much higher percentage of its population in the workforce in 2012 
than it did in 1993. In 2012, 57.9% of the population was in the workforce, 
up very substantially from 38.9% in 1993.82 This huge increase in the 
workforce has implications for unemployment because even though 
unemployment increased 1.9% in 2012 over the 1993 level, this small 
increase, coupled with the much larger workforce, means that many new 
workers were finding employment. If these new workers had not found 
jobs, the unemployment level would have been much higher. More jobs in 
Mexico are a salutary development for a nation aspiring to better lives for 
its citizens. Secondly, a similar benefit could be seen in the U.S. 
employment picture. The U.S. unemployment rate of 8.1% in 2012 can be 
attributed as much to the Great Recession as to NAFTA.  However, there 
clearly has been an erosion in U.S. jobs given the propensity of U.S. 
corporations to move their operations offshore,83 in order to reap the 
benefits of manufacturing costs—mainly labor—that are significantly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparisons of Annual Labor Force 
Statistics, 1970-2012, available at http://www.bls.gov/fls/flscomparelf.htm (last modified 
June 7, 2013) [hereinafter Labor Force Statistics]. 
82 BEVAN , supra note 24, at 53. 
83 See, e.g. David Firestone, “A Chief Exporter, and Not at All Pleased About It; North 
Carolina is Rapidly Losing Its Once-Plentiful Factory Jobs to Overseas Plants,” THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001, at A11. 
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lower than in the U.S.84 The loss of millions of U.S. manufacturing jobs 
has necessitated former U.S. blue-collar workers to shift to service jobs, 
which often pay less than those in manufacturing.  Further, the growth in 
worker participation in the employment market, evidenced by the increase 
from 49.9% in 1992/93 to 63.7% in 2010, no doubt reflects the rise in two 
wage holder families trying to maintain their standard of living while 
working for lower pay.  Also, the number of U.S. workers holding 
multiple jobs has increased for similar reasons.85 
 
Table 8:  NAFTA’s Impact on Unemployment and 
Labor Force Participation 
 
 Unemployment 
1993 
Unemployment 
201286 
Population 
in  labor 
force 
1992/9387 
Population 
in labor 
force 
201288 
Canada 11.4% 7.2% 50.1% 66.7% 
Mexico 3.2% 4.9% 38.9% 58.4% 
U.S. 6.9% 8.1% 49.9% 63.7% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See supra note 2 and associated text. 
85 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: LABOR FORCE, 
EMPLOYMENT, AND EARNINGS 390 (2012), 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/labor_force_employment_earnings.html.. 
(Multiple Jobholders 2010:  Total number 6,878,000 (4.9% of total employed; white: 
5,867,000; black: 653,000; Asian: 202,000; Hispanic: 638,000; Marital status of multiple 
jobholders:  married, spouse present: 3,644,000; widowed, divorced, or separated:  
1,233,000; single, never married:  2,000,000; Full or part-time status:  Primary job full-
time, secondary job part-time:  3,591,000; both jobs part-time: 1,805,000; both jobs full-
time::263,000).  
86 Labor Force Statistics, supra note 81.  
87 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 52-53. 
88 Labor Force Statistics, supra note 81.  
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VII. NAFTA’s IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL WORKERS IN 
NAFTA COUNTRIES 
      Since David Ricardo made labor the centerpiece of his economic 
theory, it is important to see what has happened to individual workers after 
NAFTA. First, are hourly wages in manufacturing depicted in Table 9. 
Table 9:  Hourly manufacturing wages in  
U.S. dollars pre- (1993)89 and post (2011)90  
 
Country 1993 hourly 
compensation costs in 
manufacturing 
 2011 hourly 
compensation costs 
in manufacturing 
  
Canada $16.36  $36.36   
      
Mexico $2.65  $6.48   
      
U.S. $16.79  $35.53   
 
      Table 9 reveals that hourly compensation costs in all three NAFTA 
nations have more than doubled between 1993 and 2011. Two things stand 
out:  how significantly the Mexican worker continues to lag compared to 
its two NAFTA partners; and secondly, that Canada has overtaken the 
U.S. as the high cost NAFTA manufacturer.   
      Others have argued for wage equalization using Purchasing Power 
Parity. According to this analysis, the way to determine “real wages” is to 
find the PPP for the country and apply the PPP to the actual wages paid 
(called nominal wages).91  They concluded for year 2009 that Mexican 
manufacturing workers, where cost of living for 2009 was 64 cents in PPP 
terms, should be earning $16.70 per hour in 2009. Their analysis would be 
one more example of NAFTA’s failure to benefit the working person in a 
country where the worker is exploited by management, as evidenced by 
hourly wages far below productivity levels and many other indicia of 
civilization. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 BRUCE D. FISHER & MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 258 (Jan Krygier ed., West Publishing 1995) (1983). 
90 Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. Department of Labor, International Comparisons of 
Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2011 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ichcc.pdf.  
91 See THE JUS SEMPER GLOBAL ALLIANCE, “Living Wages North and South:  Wage Gap 
Charts (manufacturing production-line wages 1975-2009) (2011);  see also CIA, supra 
note 73 (Purchasing power parities reflect the amount in dollars required in a given 
country to have the same purchasing power that $1 U.S. has in the United States; e.g., if 
the PPP index in one country is 69, then $0.69 are required in that country to buy the 
same that $1 buys in the U.S.; the cost of living is thus, higher).  
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VIII. INFLATION LEVELS IN NAFTA NATIONS AFTER 
NAFTA’s PASSAGE 
      Free trade is touted as enhancing economic wellbeing. A corollary 
to this would include reducing consumer price inflation. The NAFTA 
experience shows inflation levels for 1993 (the most recent year data was 
available). Canada had a very low 0.2% consumer price inflation rate.92 
Mexico’s rate was 6.9%,93 and the U.S. was at an inflation level of 2.6%.94 
By 2013, the inflation rate was higher in Canada at 1.5%,95 but not in the 
U.S., where inflation declined to 1.5%.96  Mexico’s inflation rate dropped 
from 6.9% to 3.8%.97  Thus, controlling inflation is a benefit of freer trade 
for two of the three nations and of only marginal detriment to Canada. 
Table 10:  NAFTA’s effect on Inflation 
 1993 Inflation rate 2013 Inflation rate 
Canada 0.2% 1.0% 
Mexico 6.9% 3.8% 
U.S. 2.6% 1.5% 
 
IX. NAFTA’s IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT:  THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX (EPI)  
       Even prior to NAFTA taking effect, there were concerns expressed 
that free trade among nations would adversely affect the environment. 
Thus, an Environmental Side Agreement was negotiated and took effect at 
the time of NAFTA’s passage.98   Rather than setting air, water, or toxic 
waste standards uniformly applicable to all three NAFTA countries, such 
as CO2/cubic meter for all NAFTA nations to follow, the Environmental 
Side Agreement requires that each NAFTA nation shall enforce its own 
pollution laws. Some have criticized this approach as being too general or 
polluter friendly.99 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 BEVAN, supra note 24, at 106.   
93 Id. at 154. 
94 Id. at 206. 
95 BURGESS, supra note 23, 
96 Id. at 128. 
97 Id. at 180. 
98 See supra note 19. 
99 See, e.g., Laura Okin Pomeroy, The Labor Side Agreement under the NAFTA:  
Analysis of Its Failure to Include Strong Enforcement Provisions and Recommendations 
for Future Labor Agreements Negotiated with Developing Countries, 30 GEO. WASH. J. 
OF INT’L. L. & ECON. 769 (1996); Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side 
Agreement:  Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American 
Treaty Making, 8 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L. J. 257 (1994). 
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       The Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, Yale 
University and the Center of International Earth Science Information 
Network at Columbia University have published the Environmental 
Performance Index (EPI) for over 100 nations since 2002 but it only 
includes data from 2000 forward.100 The EPI is a composite score covering 
several indicators such as ecosystem vitality, and public health.  The 
higher the EPI score for a nation, the better is its environmental 
performance. For example, the U.S. had an EPI ranking of 43 out of 132 
nations in year 2000101.  The U.S. EPI score was 54.3 (the top ranked 
nation (Switzerland) had an EPI of 76.2102. Table 11 compares EPI 
rankings for the three NAFTA nations for years 2000 and 2012 to show 
what has occurred environmentally in the NAFTA nations following 
NAFTA’s passage.103   
Table 11:  NAFTA Nations’ Environmental Performance 
Index Compared to that of Other Nations 
 
Nation Year 2000 Year 2012 
Canadian EPI 55.6 (ranked 36 out of 
132) 
58.41  (ranked 37th out 
of 132) 
Mexican EPI 43.3 (ranked 104 out 
of 132) 
49.11 (ranked 84th out 
of 132) 
U.S. EPI 54.3 (ranked 43 out of 
132) 
56.59 (ranked 49th out 
of 132) 
 
      The data in Table 11 reveals that all three NAFTA nations had a 
higher EPI score in 2012 than in 2000,104 evidence of improved 
environmental performance. However, these scores were only marginally 
better than in 2000, although the international rankings among nations of 
Canada and the U.S. declined slightly (from 36 to 37 for Canada and from 
43 to 49 for the U.S.).  Only Mexico improved its ranking from a dismal 
104 to a still below median of 84th.  Of the five categories of 
environmental performance in 2012, Canada fell into category 2 (strong 
performance), but the U.S. and Mexico both were in category 3 (modest 
EPI performers).105 Because the U.S. and Mexico represent over 90% of 
NAFTA’s population, NAFTA as a whole could said to be registering a 
weak environmental performance vis-à-vis non-NAFTA nations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 YALE CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, YALE UNIVERSITY, 
http://epi.yale.edu/files/2012_epi_report.pdf [hereinafter Yale]. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104  Id. 
105 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4. 
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Nonetheless, the higher EPI scores support the assertion that NAFTA 
accompanied no decline in overall environmental quality in the three 
NAFTA nations for years following 2000 to 2012, a significant part of 
NAFTA’s existence. 
X. WORLD GDP DATA FOR YEARS 1993 AND 2011 
         Before departing from analyzing the NAFTA experience with 
respect to economic impact, it is worth exploring the big picture economic 
development for the World during the same period. Table 12 presents the 
World data.106  In 1993, the world GDP was $24,108 billion and per capita 
GDP worldwide was $4,390. By 2013, the world GDP had increased to 
$73,982 billion with per capital GDP rising to an almost unbelievable 
$12,718 for Europe, $13,435 for other Asia, $5,775 for Latin American 
and Caribbean islands, and $1,318 for Sub-Saharan Africa—quite a 
spread. Thus, one can see that world GDP increased by almost three times 
over the 20 year period, while per capita GDP increased by about 2 ½ 
times.  These figures approximate comparable items for NAFTA nations 
cited earlier in this paper. 
Table 12:  World GDP Growth in the NAFTA Years 
 Nation 1993 GDP 2012/13 
GDP 
1993 Per 
Cap. GDP 
2012/13 
Per Cap. 
GDP 
World 
rank 
1993/2012 
World $24.108 
trillion 
$73.982 
trillion 
$4,390 $12,716 
(Euro 
area) 
-- 
Canada $575 
billion 
$1.780 
trillion 
$20,664 $51,206 17/16 
Mexico $325 
billion 
$1.153 
trillion 
$3,748 $9,750 50/not top 
60 
U.S. $6.388 
trillion 
$16,245 
trillion 
$24,753 $51,749 8/14 
 
     As noted earlier, all of the NAFTA nations slipped in terms of 
GDP per capita rank during NAFTA’s existence relative to non-NAFTA 
nations. It is significant that the WTO --an agreement espousing, among 
other things, free trade—has been ratified by 160 nations during this 
period.107 Thus, Ricardian ideas of free trade found elsewhere could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Generally data are for years 1993 and 2011, but if data are available for a later year, 
for instance 2012 in the case of each NAFTA nation’s unemployment rates, then the later 
year will be used. 
107 Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available 
at  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
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seen as sparking the dramatic increase in world GDP and per capita GDP 
during the 1993-2010 period. Even though the WTO followed NAFTA by 
one year, the WTO’s predecessor, GATT, preceded NAFTA by several 
decades.  The WTO’s free trade philosophy coupled with the improved 
relative performance of several WTO nations opens to question how much 
incremental improvement in economic indices such as GDP are 
attributable to the WTO/GATT rather than NAFTA.108                               
XI. FACTORIES ON WHEELS:  FAMILY AND WORKER 
SECURITY AND STABILITY PRE- AND POST  NAFTA 
      International trade breeds fluidity. Capital can flow instantly over 
the Internet. Technology transfers from nation to nation can occur quickly 
in today’s multi-national corporations given the receptivity of workers in, 
for example, Brazil, Russia, India, and China to technology training.109 
Factories are on wheels:  they close in one nation and reestablish 
themselves in to another as opportunistic entrepreneurs seek to maximize 
returns on their investments by cutting costs particularly in labor, the 
factor David Ricardo saw as fundamental to a nation’s economy.  Labor 
workers enjoy few protections in this Darwinian environment.   
      The family is recognized as the basic unit of society, the 
foundation of national well-being.  International trade could be seen in this 
context as an enemy of family and personal stability. A father or mother 
working in a factory could go home from work one day only to find their 
desk or press had disappeared overnight due to a plant closure.  Despite 
laws guarding against such happenings, the decline in manufacturing jobs 
is a terrain feature of contemporary business.110 
       NAFTA contains no explicit language supporting the family as a 
fundamental social value. One could infer, however, from language in 
NAFTA suggestive of improved economic well-being, that NAFTA will 
strengthen the family by improving its economic well-being; thereby 
creating an environment in which children’s education, family health, and 
hope for a materially brighter future will be residual benefits from freer 
trade.   
      Proxies exist for family stabilities, most obvious—divorce rates. 
Table 13 compares divorce rates for the three NAFTA nations pre- and 
post NAFTA. The divorce rate for each NAFTA nation declined between 
1993 and 2011, suggesting greater family stability in 2011 than in 1993. 
           
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See supra Table 1 as it relates to NAFTA nations’ respective GDP growth during the 
period of NAFTA existence. 
109 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4. 
110 See BEVAN, supra note 41 and associated text indicating that the manufacturing sector 
of Mexico and the US has declined during the 1993-2011 NAFTA period.  
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Table 13:  Family Stability Pre-and Post NAFTA 
Country 1993 
Divorce 
rate/1,000 
population 
1993 
Intern’l. 
Divorce 
rank 
2012 
Divorce111 
rate/1,000 
2012 
Intern’l. 
112 
Divorce  
rank 
Marriages/1,000 
population 
1993/20121 
Canada 2.9 11th 2.2 Tie 28th 7.1/4.6 
      
Mexico 0.8 Not in 
top 60 
0.8 11th 
lowest 
7.3/5.1 
      
U.S. 4.8 1st 2.8 7th 9.3/6.8 
 
    A second proxy for family stability is the number of marriages. 
According to conventional mores, marriage is a prerequisite to having a 
family. Notable here is the fact that marriages per 1,000 population 
declined about 1/3 in all three NAFTA nations between 1993 and 2011.  
Perhaps this is evidence of hesitancy to make long-term commitments in 
the face of economic instability—high youth unemployment, less secure 
jobs, and stagnant real wages—all by-products of NAFTA and a more 
international economy. 
XII. PROXIES FOR STRESS IN A SOCIETY:  HAS NAFTA 
CREATED MORE INSTABILITY AND STRESS? 
      Table 14 presents proxies for worker stress:  youth unemployment, 
poverty, obesity, diabetes, and excessive health care costs are stress 
proxies here.   
      In recent years, workers in NAFTA countries have encountered 
stress because of the lack of good jobs. Youth unemployment is high—
15.3% in Canada, 10% in Mexico, and 17.6% in the U.S.113  The 
unemployed youth are less inclined to marry and have families.  Table 13 
shows the significant drop in marriages in all three NAFTA nations 
between 1993 and 2011.   
      Jobs for adults are also scarce, driving families into poverty. Table 
14 shows that poverty is at double-digit levels in Mexico and the U.S. and 
is almost at that level in Canada at 9.4%. In part, the tight job market can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 BURGESS, supra note 23, at 89.  
112Id. 
113 CIA, supra note 73, at 131, 479, 771 (The CIA defines “youth” unemployment as 
“youths aged 15-24” as unemployed.  Canada:  15.3%; Mexico 10%; US:  17.6% (all for 
year 2009)). 
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be explained because of corporate “right-sizing,” “down-sizing,”114 and 
corporate measures designed to squeeze every ounce of productivity from 
labor.  Corporate managers rightly point to the challenge of foreign 
competitors as justification for such draconian practices lest the 
corporation find itself losing market share and even put into bankruptcy.  
An upshot of such aggressive management is worker uncertainty over 
whether they will have a job tomorrow.  In effect, U.S. managers play 
U.S. blue-collar workers off against low-cost foreign labor as a way to 
control labor costs. U.S. blue collar workers frequently receive no pay 
raises even though they witness corporate managers receiving hefty raises 
and bonuses for extracting labor concessions.115 
       Over-eating is a mechanism for dealing with stress.116 Over-eating 
which can result in obesity and even diabetes is strongly evidenced in the 
U.S. among males.  Table 14 shows that U.S. males are now ranked third 
world-wide in obesity with 31.7% obese.  Runaway medical costs are a 
further consequence of stress and obesity in the U.S.  Here, the U.S. 
spends over 17% of its GDP on the health care to address medical 
problems often resulting from job related stress.117  
      Several observations arise from Table 14 relating to stress and 
health expenditures. First, Canada appears to have the healthiest 
population in terms of obesity and diabetes, although it does spend 11.8% 
of its GDP on keeping its citizens well, ranking 8th in the world regarding 
health expenditures. Canada also has a significantly lower percentage of 
poor persons (9.4%) compared to either the U.S. (15.1%) or Mexico 
(18.2% or 47% depending on the criterion used for poverty).  Throughout 
this study, Canada has shown itself superior to the U.S. and Mexico in a 
number of measures, so its citizens’ anxiety proxies used here (obesity and 
diabetes) are understandably lower (although health spending is high). The 
U.S. proxies for societal anxiety and stress are disturbingly high:  very 
high obesity rates for men and women, high poverty levels for almost 1/6th 
of the population, and very high medical expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP (17.9%).  One would expect proxies for stress and anxiety to be high 
for Mexico given the high poverty levels, high obesity and diabetes levels 
for both men and women, and the high societal medical expenditures. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 See Bruce D. Fisher & Francois Lenglart, Employee Reductions in Force:  A 
Comparative Study of French and U.S. Legal Protections for Employees Downsized out 
of Their Jobs; A Suggested Alternative to Workforce Reductions, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L. & 
COMP. L. REV. 181 (2003). 
115 Id. at 182 (“Most C.E.O.’s are ridiculously overpaid,’  he [Al Dunlap, one-time head 
of Scott Paper and Sunbeam] wrote in his book, ‘but I deserved the $100 million I took 
away when Scott merged with Kimberly-Clark.’”  Dunlap was known as ‘Chainsaw Al’ 
as he laid off thousands of workers at Scott in the 1990’s in what he called necessary 
moves to cut Scott’s costs). 
116 Harvard Mental Health Letter, Why Stress Causes People to Overeat (2012), available 
at http://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/why-stress-causes-people-to-overeat. 
117 BURGESS  supra note 23, at  84. 
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NAFTA seems not to have been of much help to many Mexican and U.S. 
workers regarding health and anxiety. This is troubling for Mexico given 
its relative poverty, and also of concern for U.S. workers and citizens 
given its aggregate wealth, which seems not to have been spread equitably 
throughout all levels of society.118 
      Table 14 leaves us with a picture of NAFTA nations that in many 
ways fails the individual worker and members of society—particularly 
with respect to Mexico and the U.S. 
      
Table 14:  Proxies Indicative of Individual Stress and Anxiety 
   Youth 
(ages 15-
24) 
unemploy
ment year 
2009119 
Percentage of 
population below 
poverty line 
(defined by each 
nation)120 
Obesity: % 
of 
male/femal
e 
population 
2013121 
Diabetes % of 
population 
ages 20-79 
2012; country 
rank122 
% of  GDP 
spent on 
health care 
2012; world 
spending 
rank  as % of 
GDP 2012123 
Canada 15.3% 9.4% (LICO—
Low Income 
Cutoff) 
Not in top 
10 nations 
Not in top 16 
nations 
10.9%; 
spending 
ranks 12th in 
world 
      
Mexico 10% 18.2% (food 
based poverty); 
47% property 
based poverty 
Not in top 
10 nations 
Not in top 16 
nations 
6.1% of 
2012 GDP;   
health 
spending 
unranked 
international
ly124 
      
U.S.  17.6% 
nations 
15.1% (2010 
estimate) 
31.7% 
males; 
females not 
in top 10 
nations 
Not in top 16 
nations 
17.9%; 1st in 
world 
ranking 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See supra notes 64-79 and associated text.  
119 CIA, supra note 73, at 479, 771. 
120 Id. at 132, 480, 773 (Canada has a Low Income Cutoff (LICO) “…a calculation that 
results in higher figures than found in many comparable economies.  Canada does not 
have an official poverty line (2008).” Id. at  132.  As to Mexico’s poverty line:  “note 
based on food based definitions of poverty” it is 18.2%.  “Asset based poverty amounted 
to more than 47% (2008).”  Id. at 480.  The US poverty rate for 2010 was estimated at 
15.1%.  Id. at 773).  
121 BURGESS, SUPRA note 23, at 87. 
122 Id. at 84. 
123 Id. at 86. 
124 CIA, supra note 73, at 479. 
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XIII. A POST-SCRIPT:  THE ROLE OF CURRENCY 
EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
      Currencies are not part of NAFTA.125 Nonetheless, currencies 
(U.S. dollar, Canadian dollars, and Mexican pesos) have long been 
recognized as playing a key role in foreign trade. This follows because 
most foreign trade uses money as a medium of exchange rather than 
barter—exchanging goods for goods. If one country’s currency gets 
cheaper vis-à-vis others, the nation with the cheaper currency should enjoy 
an increase in exports because its goods cost less and, in effect, it is 
erecting a trade barrier against foreign goods.126  For example, if $1 U.S. 
is worth 3.11 Mexican pesos at the end of 1993,127 (which it was), then $1 
million U.S. would buy Mexican goods priced at PS 3,110,000. But what 
if $1 U.S. buys PS 13.08, as it did at the end of 2013;128 the U.S. dollar has 
appreciated significantly (PS 9.76 more per $1 U.S.).  In effect between 
1993 and 2013 the cost of Mexican goods has dropped a great deal for 
U.S. buyers, increasing the likelihood that Mexico will export more goods 
to the U.S. than in 1996. This is called a “beggar thy neighbor” policy by 
the Mexicans—a way for Mexicans to make their goods more attractive to 
U.S. buyers and disadvantage U.S. business because U.S. buyers are 
enticed to purchase Mexican goods rather than the same kind of U.S. 
goods, which are now relatively more expensive.   
      Over the NAFTA years, the Canadian dollar has seen a marked 
change in its value relative to the U.S. dollar but in the opposite direction 
than the Mexican peso relative to the dollar.  Thus, in 1993 the U.S. dollar 
was worth $1.32 Canadian.129  In other words, in 1993 U.S. buyers of 
Canadian goods received over a 30% discount when they bought Canadian 
goods. Obviously, this exchange rate worked to the advantage of the 
Canadian businesses because it made their goods attractively priced to the 
U.S. market. However, unlike the Mexican peso, over NAFTA’s life, the 
Canadian dollar appreciated against the U.S. dollar.  This makes Canadian 
goods more expensive for the American market and, to some extent, acts 
as a brake on Canadian exports to the U.S.  Referring to Table 4 which 
discloses a two and one-half dollar increase in Canadian exports to the 
U.S. from 1993 to 2011, one wonders what this increase would have been 
had there been no substantial appreciation in the Canadian dollar vis-à-vis 
the U.S. dollar during this period.  On the other hand, the Canadian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 But see, Kelly Hugger, NAFTA Toward a Common Currency:  An Economic 
Feasibility Study, 4 UG ECON. REV (2008), available at 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol4/iss1/5. 
126 See Buttonwood, What Devaluation Actually Means, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2013, 
available at www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2013/02/currencies.  
127  MICHAEL COULMAN ET AL, THE ECONOMIST WORLD IN FIGURES 1995 148 (Hamish 
Hamilton 1994). 
128 BURGESS,  supra note 23, at 180.   
129 COULMAN,  supra note 127, at 100.	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dollar’s appreciated value vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar entices Canadian 
consumers to purchase more U.S. goods because their dollar is, by 2012, 
worth more and buys more in the U.S. market than in 1993.  Thus, 
referring again to Table 4, one would have expected Canadian imports 
from the U.S. to be even higher than the slightly more than doubling that 
took place from 1993 to 2012. This Canadian experience suggests that 
currency is not necessarily the controlling factor in determining the 
magnitude of international trade. 
      The point of mentioning currency values in a discussion of 
NAFTA is this:  NAFTA has as a main goal the removal of trade barriers. 
Yet the shifting of currency values between trading partners can nullify or 
reinforce trading incentives just as much (or more) than provisions of a 
trade agreement calling for a removal of a 5% tariff of goods imported 
from a trading partner. 
         Table 15 summarizes the change in NAFTA nations’ currency 
values vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar moving from the end of 1993 to the end of 
2012. Thus, currency values should not be ignored when an attempt is 
made to affect trade flows internationally. 
Table 15:  Changes in Canadian and Mexican 
Currency Values from 1993 to 2012 
 
Country Foreign 
currency 
Value of 
foreign 
currency at 
end 1993 in 
U.S. $ 
Value of 
foreign 
currency at 
end  
 
Canada Canadian $ $.7575 $.99  
     
Mexico Mexican 
peso 
$.3215 $0.0777  
     
U.S. U.S. $ $1.00 $1.00  
 
Conclusion 
       NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994.  Sufficient time has 
lapsed to judge whether it has achieved its goals. This paper presents 
economic and social data before and after NAFTA came into effect in 
order to evaluate how successful it has been.  The macro income and GDP 
data support the proposition that reducing trade barriers among Canada, 
Mexico, and the U.S. has led to much higher GDP and per capita GDP for 
all three nations from years prior to NAFTA’s passage to the year 2010. 
Also, inflation levels in the U.S. and Mexico dropped and Canada’s was 
essentially flat in 2011 compared to the early 1990s. Accordingly, 
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Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage finds some support in the 
NAFTA experience. Environmental indices, while far from glowing for 
the NAFTA nations, do not show that harm in this key area has worsened 
from pre-1994 levels. 
           Several cautionary notes must be sounded to avoid overstating 
NAFTA’s success. First, the Human Development Index of all NAFTA 
nations dropped relative to nations outside of NAFTA during the period of 
1993 to 2012. Thus, even though absolute levels of economic, health, and 
education have improved in NAFTA nations over the period studied, such 
rankings of Mexico and Canada and, in a few economic and other 
categories—even the U.S.—have fallen relative to non-NAFTA nations. 
Further, in some respects, NAFTA is seen as hostile to environmental 
concerns given the fact that Mexico and the U.S. are not among the best or 
even good environmental performers during the period. Although Mexico 
and the U.S. did register slight gains in Yale’s Environmental Performance 
Index—but to label such “gains” as environmental achievement in either 
Mexico or the U.S. would be an exaggeration. Canada, by comparison, 
excelled in environmental performance during the NAFTA period.    
      Whenever evaluations of agreements or laws are made by 
comparing data over time, one must be aware of the post hoc ergo propter 
hoc fallacy—that is, attributing causation to something—here improved 
wellbeing—that follows something else—here NAFTA. That which 
follows could be the result of other unstated but relevant factor or 
factors—for example, technological development or currency 
devaluations.  Technology or currency adjustments could be causally more 
significant than NAFTA or any trade agreement in improving the 
economic wellbeing of both NAFTA and non-NAFTA nations.   
      It is also noteworthy that as the assessment of NAFTA moves from 
the macro to the micro considerations, the benefits of NAFTA’s free trade 
ethos weaken. Lower relative Human Development Indices of NAFTA 
nations compared to other nations, the experience of NAFTA nations’ per 
capita GDP compared to nations outside NAFTA, and the GINI indices, 
all indicate that NAFTA has imposed hardships on average workers. 
Instability in the workplace has led to decreased worker long-term 
employment security. Objective proxies show that NAFTA has exacted 
worker costs in terms of stress, disease, and health costs.   
      A fair analysis of NAFTA’s costs and benefits leaves open the 
question of whether NAFTA has proven beneficial to all strata of society 
or been more beneficial to upper echelons of NAFTA nations—the 
capitalists, entrepreneurs, and professional classes--with costs borne more 
by the working class. Further evidence of labor’s reduced significance is 
one glaring anomaly:  labor (and environmental concerns) were not even 
in the NAFTA, but, rather, relegated to “side” agreements, much as poor 
relations are “seated below the salt”  at family reunions—in attendance, 
but in a diminished status.  
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      Nonetheless, a principal goal of NAFTA was to reduce trade 
barriers between NAFTA nations. NAFTA itself set no express goals 
regarding worker or environmental welfare (despite politicians’ statements 
suggesting otherwise).  NAFTA set the bar low regarding labor and 
environmental concerns by relegating them to “side” agreements, and 
NAFTA has met this modest goal.  NAFTA’s success lies in reducing 
trade barriers given the vast expansion of trade in all NAFTA nations 
during 1993-2012.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
